FILED
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles

JAN 2 3 2017

SHERRIN CARTER EXECUTIVE OFFICERICLERK
BY Doputy
Shery Riches Humber

# SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES CLARA SHORTRIDGE FOLTZ CRIMINAL JUSTICE CENTER CRIMINAL WRITS CENTER

STATEMENT OF FACTS <sup>1</sup>		
Deputy District Attorneys Robert Grace and K	enneth Lynch. Granted.	
by Jeffrey I. Ehrlich, Esq. Respondent, the Pec	ople of the State of California, represented by	
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by I	Raymond Lee Jennings ("Petitioner"), represented	
	}	
On Habeas Corpus		
Petitioner,	) (PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS ) CORPUS)	
RAYMOND LEE JENNINGS,	) MEMORANDUM OF DECISION	
In re	) Case No.: MA033/12	

The following facts and procedural history are adopted from the Court of Appeal opinion, *People v. Raymond Lee Jennings* (Dec. 19, 2011, B222959) [nonpub. opn.] ("*Jennings*").

drove from Palmdale, California to Los Angeles, California to appear as extras in a music video

film shoot. O'Keefe left her blue Mustang parked under a light post at a Park-and-Ride

On February 22, 2000, 18-year old Michelle O'Keefe and her friend, Jennifer Peterson,

AR 1

24 25

22

23

27 28

26

commuter parking lot in Palmdale and rode to Los Angeles in Peterson's car. At approximately 9:22 p.m., O'Keefe and Peterson returned to Palmdale. Peterson dropped O'Keefe off in the Park-and-Ride lot at O'Keefe's Mustang. As O'Keefe got into her Mustang and started the engine, Peterson drove away. O'Keefe had planned to attend her evening college class that night and intended to change clothes, since her outfit for the music video shoot - a tube top and kneelength skirt - would not have been appropriate for class. Perhaps in an effort to change clothes in a less conspicuous spot, O'Keefe moved the Mustang from under the light post to a more remote parking spot on the northern edge of the lot.

Petitioner, a military veteran, was a security guard at the Park-and-Ride parking lot. At 9:32 p.m., Petitioner contacted his supervisor, Iris Malone, on a two-way radio to report hearing gunshots. Malone arrived at the scene at 9:42 p.m. Petitioner directed Malone's attention to O'Keefe's Mustang. The Mustang had rolled backwards and come to rest with its rear wheels in a planter. Malone directed Petitioner to accompany her to the Mustang, but he refused. Malone drove to the Mustang alone and saw O'Keefe with her legs partially outside the open car door.

Malone radioed Petitioner and told him to call the police. At 9:49 p.m., Los Angeles County Sheriff's Deputy Billy Cox arrived at the scene. Cox noticed the Mustang's engine was running, in neutral, and that the emergency brake was disengaged. O'Keefe had suffered multiple wounds, including blunt force trauma to her forehead and four gunshot wounds to her face and chest.

Los Angeles County Sheriff's Detectives Diane Harris and Richard Longshore arrived approximately three hours after the shooting. The detectives found O'Keefe's wallet in the Mustang, which contained credit cards and \$111 in cash. They also discovered two expended projectiles and three shell casings on the ground between the parking spot where O'Keefe had moved the Mustang and the car's resting place in the planter. A firearms expert later concluded the projectiles and shell casings all came from the same nine millimeter handgun.

At the time of the shooting, Victoria Richardson and three other people were sitting in a parked car near the northwest corner of the parking lot. The group was smoking marijuana and listening to music. Richardson stated that she heard a car alarm go off and then heard multiple

"tapping" noises. A few minutes later, Richardson saw a security car drive by. It was at this time that Richardson and her companions decided to leave the parking lot. As they were driving out of the lot, Richardson stopped the car and asked Petitioner what had happened. He responded that he did not know, and Richardson and the others subsequently left the parking lot.

Later that night, Petitioner told investigators that he had been patrolling the parking lot on foot when he heard a car alarm and a single gunshot. He stated that he ducked behind his car for cover, but looked up and saw O'Keefe's Mustang rolling into the planter. Petitioner recalled that he heard five more shots but never saw the shooter. Petitioner stated he did not see anyone leave the area by foot or by car. Petitioner explained that he radioed his supervisor for help, but remained by his car because he did not know whether the shooter was still in the parking lot. Three days after the shooting, Petitioner resigned from his security guard job.

Five years later, Petitioner was arrested and charged with O'Keefe's murder. The People's case against Petitioner was purely circumstantial. There were no eyewitnesses identifying Petitioner as the shooter, and investigators never found the murder weapon. Investigators also tested Petitioner's security guard uniform, but did not find any gunshot residue, blood, or fibers from O'Keefe's clothing. Additionally, DNA of an unidentified male was found under O'Keefe's fingernails, but it did not match Petitioner.

#### PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner pleaded not guilty, and the case went to trial three times. The first two trials took place for "administrative reasons" in downtown Los Angeles after Petitioner unsuccessfully moved for a change of venue due to the publicity garnered by the case in the Antelope Valley, which includes Palmdale. The first trial took place in the spring of 2008 and ended in a mistrial. The jury hung 9-to-3 in favor of guilt. The second trial, in February 2009, also ended in a mistrial, with the jury hanging 11-to-1 in favor of guilt. The third trial was held in the Antelope Valley, where the crime occurred and the case had been widely publicized. On December 18, 2010, the third jury convicted Petitioner of second-degree murder. On February 18, 2010, Petitioner was sentenced to state prison for 40 years to life.

On December 19, 2011, the California Court of Appeal, Second District, affirmed Petitioner's conviction in an unpublished decision, finding there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's conclusion. (*People v. Raymond Lee Jennings* (Dec. 19, 2011, B222959) [nonpub. opn.] ("*Jennings*").)

## Conviction Review Unit Investigation

On June 29, 2015, Los Angeles County District Attorney Jackie Lacey announced the creation of the District Attorney's Office's new Conviction Review Unit ("CRU"), which was established to "address credible claims of innocence made by people currently incarcerated for serious and violent felonies." (Los Angeles District Attorney's Office News Release, "D.A. Jackie Lacey Announces Creation of Conviction Review Unit" (Jun. 29, 2015)

<a href="http://da.lacounty.gov/sites/default/files/press/062915\_DA\_Jackie\_Lacey\_Announces\_Creation\_of\_Conviction\_Review\_Unit.pdf">Lacey\_Announces\_Creation\_of\_Conviction\_Review\_Unit.pdf</a> [as of Jan. 20, 2017].)

On October 2, 2015, Petitioner's counsel, Jeffrey I. Ehrlich, wrote a letter to Assistant Head Deputy District Attorney Kenneth Lynch urging the CRU to review Petitioner's case. On March 2, 2016, Petitioner supplemented the October letter by completing the CRU's "Conviction Review Request" form and answering a list of 23 questions regarding Petitioner's case. To support his claims, Petitioner also included new reports from four experts, including a criminal profiling expert, a security expert, the director of a forensic laboratory, and a firearms and ballistics expert.

The CRU agreed to review the case, and on June 22, 2016, Chief Deputy District Attorney John K. Spillane submitted a letter to this Court under seal.<sup>2</sup> The letter stated that the CRU "undertook a complete and thorough review of the case which included a request that the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (LASD) reopen the investigation into the murder," and stipulated that the letter would serve as Jennings's petition for writ of habeas corpus based on newly discovered evidence. (Letter dated June 22, 2016 at pp. 1, 18.) On June 23, 2016, at the request of the parties, the Court deemed the letter to be a joint habeas corpus petition (hereinafter, the "Joint Petition"), and pursuant to Penal Code section 1476, released Petitioner

aR

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The letter was unsealed by this Court on January 5, 2017.

from custody on his own recognizance pending the completion of the ongoing investigation. (Minute Order dated Jun. 23, 2016, p. 2.) The District Attorney had no objection to Petitioner's release, and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation lifted their hold on Petitioner on June 23, 2016.

In an addendum to the Joint Petition dated December 20, 2016, the District Attorney's Office informed the Court that based on the new investigation, it has ruled out Petitioner as a suspect in O'Keefe's murder, and that, as a result, it "agrees that Raymond Jennings is entitled to relief through habeas corpus based on newly discovered evidence pointing to his factual innocence." The addendum also states that the District Attorney's Office will not seek to retry Petitioner for O'Keefe's murder.<sup>3</sup>

On January 5, 2017, Petitioner also filed a Motion for Finding of Factual Innocence ("Motion"). That same day, the Court held an *in camera* hearing with representatives from the District Attorney's Office and the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department to discuss the current status of the investigation.<sup>4</sup>

As requested during a Marsy's Law presentation by the victim's parents, Michael and Patricia O'Keefe, the Court has also reviewed the closing arguments of Deputy District Attorney Michael Blake, and Petitioner's trial counsel, David Houchin, Esq., given during Petitioner's third trial.<sup>5</sup>

AR.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> This case marks the first time that the Conviction Review Unit has recommended that a conviction be vacated and the Petitioner exonerated. Due to the importance of this decision, the Court wished to outline its reasoning in writing.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The specifics of the hearing remain under seal so as to not compromise the ongoing investigation, but the Court has been briefed on the developments made in the investigation since June 2016, and that information further corroborates the newly discovered evidence that has been made available to the public.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Mr. O'Keefe also requested that the Court speak to the prosecuting attorney, Mr. Blake. For ethical reasons, the Court is prohibited from having ex parte communications with Mr. Blake. At the time of trial, Mr. Blake was unaware of the information now relied upon by the CRU. Mr. Blake has since been informed of the new information, but he has chosen not to address the Court.

#### APPLICABLE LAW

## i. Newly Discovered Evidence

"Because a petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeks to collaterally attack a presumptively final criminal judgment, the petitioner bears a heavy burden initially to plead sufficient grounds for relief, and then later to prove them." (*People v. Duvall* (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474.) In habeas corpus collateral attacks, "all presumptions favor the truth, accuracy, and fairness of the conviction and sentence; *defendant* thus must undertake the burden of overturning them." (*People v. Gonzalez* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1260, italics in original.)

"Habeas corpus will lie to vindicate a claim that newly discovered evidence demonstrates a prisoner is actually innocent." (*In re Hardy* (2007) 41 Cal.4th 977, 1016.) "[A] criminal judgment may be collaterally attacked on habeas corpus on the basis of newly discovered evidence if such evidence casts fundamental doubt on the accuracy and reliability of the proceedings." (*In re Lawley* (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1231, 1239 ("*Lawley*"), internal citations and quotation marks omitted.) "It is not sufficient that the evidence might have weakened the prosecution case or presented a more difficult question for the judge or jury." (*In re Clark* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 766 ("*Clark*").) The evidence must "undermine the entire prosecution case and point unerringly to innocence or reduced culpability." (*Lawley*, *supra*, 42 Cal.4th at p. 1239, citing *In re Hall* (1981) 30 Cal.3d 408, 417.) "[E]vidence which is uncertain, questionable or directly in conflict with other testimony does not afford a ground for relief upon habeas corpus." (*In re Lindley* (1947) 29 Cal.3d 709, 722 ("*Lindley*").) If "a reasonable jury could have rejected" the evidence, the habeas petitioner has not satisfied his or her burden. (*Clark*, *supra*, 5 Cal.4th at p. 798, fn. 33.)

In addition, Penal Code<sup>6</sup> section 1473, a new version of which became effective on January 1, 2017, was amended to allow a writ of habeas corpus to be prosecuted on the basis of new evidence. Specifically, section 1473, subdivision (b)(3)(A) states that a writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted if "[n]ew evidence exists that is credible, material, presented without substantial delay, and of such decisive force and value that it would have more likely than not

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.

changed the outcome at trial." (§ 1473, subd. (b)(3)(A).) Section 1473 defines new evidence as "evidence that has been discovered after trial, that could not have been discovered prior to trial by the exercise of due diligence, and is admissible and not merely cumulative, corroborative, collateral, or impeaching." (§ 1473, subd. (b)(3)(B).)

As discussed *post*, the Court finds Petitioner has met his burden for habeas corpus relief under both the *Lawley* standard and the more lenient section 1473 standard.

#### **DISCUSSION**

## i. New Evidence Implicating Other Suspects

The Joint Petition states that "[n]ewly discovered evidence has been revealed that suggests a person or persons *other* than Mr. Jennings may have murdered Ms. O'Keefe." (Joint Petition at p. 1, emphasis added.) Specifically, the "newly discovered evidence supports the inference that Ms. O'Keefe may have been killed by gang members during a robbery." (Joint Petition at p. 18.) The Joint Petition discusses new information regarding two individuals, other than Petitioner, who were at the crime scene at the time of the murder: Jane Doe and John Doe.<sup>7</sup>

According to the newly discovered evidence, Jane Doe is a documented gang member and claims to associate only with other gang members. Jane Doe was arrested two weeks after O'Keefe's murder for assault with a deadly weapon. At that time, she claimed to have information about O'Keefe's murder. Jane told investigators that she saw a black Toyota Tercel drive past her car at the time of the murder. She stated the car was driven by a white male wearing a white shirt and sideways baseball hat. Since the time of O'Keefe's murder, Jane has been arrested numerous times for violent crimes, including attempted murder. (Joint Petition at pp. 13-14.)

Jane Doe was with John Doe in the parking lot at the time of the murder. John Doe is also a documented gang member with an extensive criminal record. Four months after O'Keefe's murder, John Doe was involved in a carjacking, an attempted carjacking, and a

Oue to the ongoing nature of the investigation, these two individuals were so described anonymously in the Joint Petition and will remain anonymous at the joint request of the District Attorney and the Sheriff's investigators.

robbery in which he stole the victim's Mustang. John used a nine millimeter handgun in the commission of these crimes. When John was arrested in June of 2000, he was wearing an earring that matched the description of earrings that O'Keefe was wearing at the time of her death. John Doe was never interviewed about the O'Keefe murder.<sup>8</sup> (Joint Petition at pp. 14-17.)

# ii. New Expert Testimony Regarding Motive

In light of the new evidence regarding the other people present at the time of the murder. Petitioner retained criminal profiling expert Peter Klismet to review the case. Specifically, Klismet was retained to analyze the testimony of the prosecution's expert witness, former FBI Special Agent Mark Safarik. (Report by Peter M. Klismet of Criminal Profiling Associates, LLC, p. 1, attached to Motion as Exh. 1 ("Klismet Report").) At trial, Safarik concluded that O'Keefe was murdered as the result of an attempted sexual assault, which then escalated into a homicide. (*Jennings*, at p.\*10.) This conclusion was an essential part of the prosecution's case. In fact, the Court of Appeal noted that "Safarik was the only witness who testified that the killer's apparent motive was to commit a sexual assault that was poorly planned and quickly escalated to a homicide. This testimony may have been crucial to the prosecution's case because, without it, there was no evidence from which the jury might infer the motive or the perpetrator's intent in killing O'Keefe." (*Jennings*, at p.\*11.)

Upon being informed of the new evidence relating to Jane Doe and John Doe, Safarik withdrew his previous opinion and filed a declaration in support of Petitioner's habeas petition. (Declaration of Mark E. Safarik, dated Aug. 24, 2016, attached to Motion as Exh. 12 ("Safarik Declaration").) Safarik explained that his original conclusion was based on an assumption that

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> One month after O'Keefe's murder, a newspaper reporter informed the Sheriff's Department that the newspaper had received an anonymous tip regarding the murder. The caller stated that two gang members were in the Park-and-Ride parking lot stealing rims and hub caps. The gang members allegedly attempted to carjack O'Keefe's Mustang, but something went wrong and she was shot. Investigators attempted to validate this tip, but ultimately concluded "some of the assertions made by the anonymous caller appeared to be far-fetched or improbable, based upon the evidence at the scene and the totality of the investigation conducted to date." (Joint Petition at p. 10.)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> During closing arguments in Petitioner's third trial, Deputy District Attorney Michael Blake stated, "There is a sexual component to this crime. That is the motive, and that's how it began." (Transcript of Proceedings in *People v. Jennings*, dated Nov. 23, 2009-Nov. 25, 2009, at p. 7256.)

the information available to him at the time was the result of a "comprehensive, thorough, and well-planned investigation." (Safarik Declaration at p. 2.) Safarik stated that at the time he prepared the original report for this case, and at the time he testified at trial as a witness for the prosecution, he "assumed and believed that the investigators had interviewed all witnesses who were present at the scene when the murder occurred, and had evaluated the information they provided in light of all the facts, including their respective criminal backgrounds (or lack thereof)." (Safarik Declaration at p. 5.) Upon learning that investigators had neglected to interview all witnesses present at the crime scene, Safarik indicated the following: "Had I been aware in July 2007 that this portion of the investigation had not been conducted, I would not have been able to formulate a reliable opinion about the case or to have written a report about the O'Keefe murder, because I would not have had sufficient information to do so." (Safarik Declaration at p. 6.) Based on the information that has now come to light as a result of the CRU's review of this case, Safarik states he is not confident he would still reach all of the same conclusions or opinions expressed in his original report and trial testimony. (Safarik Declaration at p. 6.)

Petitioner's expert provided an alternate theory based on the new information implicating other possible suspects. Klismet concluded that the evidence strongly suggested the murder was the result of a botched robbery, in part because O'Keefe's cell phone was stolen and the glove compartment was ransacked. (Klismet Report at p. 9.). O'Keefe's wallet was wedged between the seat and the center console and hidden from view, which could explain why it was not taken. (Klismet Report at p. 9.) Klismet cited the Crime Classification Manual in concluding the murder fit the characteristics of "situational felony murder." (Klismet Report at pp. 4-5.) In a situational felony murder scenario, the offender often kills the victim in a panic and flees the scene. (Klismet Report at p. 4.) Indications of a situational felony murder scenario include blunt force trauma, close-contact gunshot wounds, and some sort of alarm or trigger that prompts a panicked killing. The offender is often young, inexperienced, and possibly under the influence of drugs or alcohol. (Klismet Report at pp. 4-5.) After comparing these factors to the facts

28

present in this case, Klismet concluded that O'Keefe's murder was likely the result of a gangrelated robbery attempt, with all the hallmarks of a situational felony murder scenario.

## iii. New Expert Testimony Regarding Ballistics

At trial, the prosecution's firearms experts testified that the ammunition used in this crime was a combination of different types of ammunition made by different manufacturers. This evidence was presented to support the notion that Petitioner's military training provided him with the skill and knowledge to combine different types of ammunition in order to achieve a greater degree of damage. (Forensic Firearms and Ballistics Report by Ronald R. Scott, p. 4, attached to Motion as Exh. 9 ("Scott Report").) However, Petitioner's ballistics expert, Robert Scott, now contends that, to the contrary, this evidence is indicative of inexperience because "[a]n experienced shooter would never mix ammunition from manufacturers. When shooting crimes are committed and evidence is recovered which shows that different makes and types of ammunition came from a single firearm, it is a clear and convincing sign that the person simply loaded whatever they could get their hands on. Persons who cannot legally purchase ammunition and use the same brand and design with the same consistent velocity and energy will acquire whatever they can from other sources." (Scott Report at p. 5.) Scott stated this is a common occurrence with street gangs because firearms and ammunition are often shared among members. (Scott Report at p. 5.) This new report suggesting a connection between the ballistics evidence and gang activity, which has only become plausible since the discovery of the new suspects and their gang connections, further supports the theory that the murder may have been gang-related.

While the investigation into the tragic murder of Michelle O'Keefe is still ongoing, the newly discovered evidence disclosed thus far has directed the People's focus away from Petitioner and on to other possible suspects. In June 2016, the District Attorney's Office acknowledged that the "evidence that other people present at the scene committed crimes with handguns close in time and similar in nature to the instant matter and left the scene before law enforcement could arrive raises questions about the validity of Mr. Jennings's conviction."

1718

19

14

15

16

2021

2223

2425

2627

28

(Joint Petition at p. 18.) The information gathered in recent months has only bolstered this conclusion.

As the Court of Appeal acknowledged, Safarik's expert testimony regarding a sexual motive was the cornerstone of a case based purely on circumstantial evidence. The newly discovered evidence tends to negate that motive by providing an alternate explanation that takes into account the similarities between this crime and other crimes committed around the same time by documented gang members who were parked a short distance away from O'Keefe's Mustang on the night of the murder. There is no doubt that the prosecution's case would have been decidedly different without Safarik's testimony regarding a possible sexual motive, or if the alternative theory of a gang-related robbery attempt had been presented to the jury. The People agree that "Jane's and John's age, gang involvement, criminal histories, and presence at the crime scene lend credence to the opinions of the retired FBI profiler and ballistics expert [that] the crime was a robbery committed by gang members, rather than a sexual assault which escalated into a murder." (Joint Petition at p. 18.) If additional information regarding the presence of the gang members at the scene had been presented at trial, along with the lack of physical evidence implicating Petitioner, the Court concludes, as the District Attorney's CRU has, that no reasonable jury would have been able to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner was guilty of killing O'Keefe.

#### **CONCLUSION**

The Court finds that the new evidence casts "fundamental doubt on the accuracy and reliability of the proceedings" and would tend to "undermine the entire prosecution case and point unerringly to innocence or reduced culpability" so as to warrant habeas relief. (*Lawley*, *supra*, 42 Cal.4th at p. 1239.) The Court also finds that the newly discovered evidence would have more likely than not changed the outcome at trial, and therefore also satisfies the new section 1473 standard. (§ 1473, subd. (b)(3)(A).)

Lastly, the Court does not come to this decision lightly, and is not unmindful of the feelings of Michelle O'Keefe's family and friends. This case marks the first time that the District Attorney's Conviction Review Unit has recommended that a conviction be vacated and

the defendant be found factually innocent. <sup>10</sup> The Court acknowledges the impact its decision will undoubtedly have on the family and friends of Michelle O'Keefe, and the dismay or worse they must now feel that a closed matter has been reopened and overturned. Michelle's mother, Patricia O'Keefe, pointed out when she addressed the court at the hearing that 32 jurors, one trial judge and three Justices of the Court of Appeal felt there was sufficient evidence to convict Petitioner. Undoubtedly, the O'Keefe's feel a grave injustice has now been perpetrated.

But justice is not measured by the number of people who support the conviction.

Jennings spent eleven years of his life in prison based on a conviction in which the prosecuting authorities themselves have declared publically that they now have no confidence. That conclusion was based on evidence developed by further investigation by the Sheriff and which was never presented to the prosecutor or to any of the juries that considered the charges against Jennings. Indeed, that investigation now expressly *excludes* Jennings as being the perpetrator. While to the O'Keefe's and others it may feel it is unjust to now grant Jennings relief, it is even more unjust to keep a man in prison who has been excluded by the lawful authorities as the perpetrator after an investigation, and further, as to whom those authorities now acknowledge to not merely be not guilty of the crime, but factually innocent of it. As to those who may say that now no conviction is ever truly final as long as convictions can be "reviewed," an ancient maxim of common law jurisprudence comes to mind: "Fiat justitia, ruat caelum," which translates as "Let justice be done, though the heavens may fall."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> The Court has held the Motion for a Finding of Factual Innocence in abeyance pending service of it by the District Attorney upon the Attorney General, as required by law. Penal Code § 1485.5(b).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Attributed to Lord Mansfield, sitting as Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, in *Somerset v Stewart* (1772) 98 ER 499, 20 Howell's State Trials 1, at 79, commonly known as *Somerset's Case*. English common law, not repugnant to the United States and California constitutions, is the rule of decision in all California courts. Civil Code § 22.2.

#### DISPOSITION

For all the foregoing reasons, the Joint Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is GRANTED. Petitioner's sentence of 40 years to life is recalled, the conviction is vacated and set aside, and the charges against Raymond Lee Jennings are dismissed.

The Clerk is ordered to serve a copy of this order upon Jeffrey I. Ehrlich, Esq., as counsel for Petitioner, and upon Deputy District Attorneys Robert Grace and Assistant Head Deputy District Attorney Kenneth Lynch, as counsel for Co-Petitioner the People of the State of California. A courtesy copy is to be served on Supervising Deputy Attorney General Julie Malone, as counsel for Petitioner's nominal custodian, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

Dated: January 23, 2017

WILLIAM C. RYAN
Judge of the Superior Court

AF

1	Send a copy of this order to:
2	Counsel for Petitioner
3	Jeffrey I. Ehrlich
4	The Ehrlich Law Firm 16130 Ventura Blvd., Suite 610
5	Encino, CA 91436
6	Counsel for Respondent
7	Office of the District Attorney
8	Attn: Robert Grace and Kenneth Lynch
9	320 W. Temple St., Suite 540 Los Angeles, CA 90012
10	
11	Counsel for the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
12   13	Department of Justice – State of California Office of the Attorney General
14	300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 Los Angeles, CA 90013 Attn: Julie Malone, Supervising Deputy Attorney General
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	
27	
28	